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Horty, Rigoni and Prakken have developed formal characterisa-
tions of precedential constraint based on dimensions and factors as
introduced in HYPO and CATO. We discuss the relation between
dimensions and factors and also describe the current models of
precedential constraint based on factors, along with some criti-
cisms of them. We argue that problems arise from ignoring the
structure of legal cases that is provided by the notion of issues,
and that seeing precedential constraint in terms of issues rather
than whole cases provides a more effective approach and better
reflects legal practice. The advantages of the issue based approach
are illustrated with a concrete example. We then discuss how dimen-
sions should be accommodated, suggesting that this is best done
by seeing reasoning with legal cases as a two stage process: first
factors are ascribed to cases and then factor based reasoning can
be used to arrive at a decision. Thus precedential constraint can be
described in terms of factors, dimensions being handled at the first
stage. Both stages are constrained, in different ways, by precedents:
we identify three types of precedent: framework precedents which
structure cases into issues, preference precedents which resolve
conflicts between opposing sets of factors within these issues, and
ascription precedents which constrain the mapping from facts to
factors.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Reasoning with precedent cases has been a central concern of AI
and Law since the very beginning. At least three questions can
be posed in relation to reasoning with precedent cases: (1) how do
people reason with precedents? (2) can we use precedents to predict
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the outcome of new cases? and (3) can we formally characterise how
precedents constrain future cases?
An early project addressing precedential reasoning was the
HYPO project of Rissland and Ashley, introduced at the first ICAIL
[43] and most fully described in [6]. HYPOmodelled reasoning with
precedents in the US Trade Secrets domain. It influenced a great
deal of research by a number of different researchers, as discussed in
[10], including the CATO system of Ashley and Aleven, introduced
in [4] and most fully described in [3]. CATO also addressed US
Trade Secrets. Both HYPO and CATO were concerned with the first
of our questions: their goal was to show how arguments concerning
new cases can be constructed on the basis of precedent cases, and
how such arguments can be challenged by distinguishing the cited
precedents. These systems presented arguments for and against
particular decisions, but did not attempt to choose between them:
that was left to the judgement of the user.
In contrast, systems based on rules, whether based on expert
knowledge [49], or on a formalisation of legislation [47], or a com-
bination of the two [8], were able to predict the outcome of a new
case entered into the system, answering our second question. It was
therefore a natural development to adapt systems such as CATO
to offer predictions based on reasoning with precedents. This was
done in the Issue Based Prediction system (IBP) [21], in which ar-
guments generated from CATO were organised and evaluated so as
to predict an outcome. Subsequently Grabmair further developed
this approach to accommodate his value judgement formalism [24].
Predictions based on precedent continue to be implemented in both
symbolic systems [2] and machine learning (ML) systems such as
[35] which base their predictions on large collections of case deci-
sions. Factor based reasoning is acquiring an important new role
in explaining the predictions of ML systems (e.g. [19] and [38]).
The reasoning in HYPO and CATO was embodied in algorithms
rather than expressed declaratively and so was not readily amenable
to formalisation to address the third question. This situation was
changed when Prakken and Sartor provided a means of expressing
a case base of precedents as a set of rules and priorities between
them [39]. The resulting rule base could then be deployed to predict
the outcome of a new case. Further, this laid the foundations for
the provision of a formal account of precedential constraint1. The
work was begun by Horty [26], using a factor based representation
taken from [6] and [3]. His approach was developed in [30] and
extended by Rigoni in [41]. However, it became recognised that
factors were not sufficient to capture all the necessary nuances of
precedents: some aspects of cases can favour a party to different
extents. The need to address dimensions was argued in [15] and
1These formal accounts consider that a decision is constrained if any other decision
would be inconsistent with past decisions. In practice this constraint may not be
respected in given judicial settings. For a jursiprudential discussion see [46].
ICAIL’21, June 21–25, 2021, São Paulo, Brazil Bench-Capon and Atkinson
addressed by Horty in [27], [28] and [29] and by Rigoni in [42]. A
comparison of the approaches of Horty and Rigoni is given in [37].
In this paper we will address the question of how precedents
constrain decisions in new cases, and in particular identify how
domain knowledge can complement the purely formal characterisa-
tions. Section 2 reviews the use of dimensions and factors in HYPO
and CATO to clarify their different roles: whereas dimensions iden-
tify the aspects of cases which must be considered, factors record
their legal significance in the particular case by identifying the
party favoured by that aspect. Section 3 gives an overview of the
formalisations of precedential constraint using factors. In Section 4
we show how these approaches can be improved by exploiting the
structure found in legal cases. Section 5 considers how to accommo-
date dimensions, by considering precedential reasoning as a two
stage process. First factors are ascribed on the basis of dimensional
facts and then these factors supply the reasons to resolve the is-
sues, and hence constrain the overall decision. Different precedents
are relevant at each stage: some constrain the ascription of factors
while others constrain the preferences between sets of factors.
The contributions of the paper are: improvement in the formal
characterisation of precedential constraint, both in terms of effec-
tiveness and in reflecting actual decisions, by applying it to issues
rather than whole cases; clarification of the role of dimensions by
articulating the reasoning process into two distinct stages; and iden-
tifying the need to recognise that precedents operate differently at
the two stages. Throughout the paper we use examples from US
Trade Secrets cases, the most widely discussed domain for reason-
ing with precedents in AI and Law: as well as HYPO and CATO it
has been used in [21], [22], [2], [24], [13], [36], [50] and [38], among
many others.
2 DIMENSIONS AND FACTORS
To relate formal work on precedential constraint to actual legal
cases, it is important to have a clear understanding of factors and
dimensions and the relationship between them. The terms have
been used in different ways, but we will consider dimensions as
used in HYPO and factors as used in CATO, discussed by Rissland
and Ashley in [44]. This is the most common use, and HYPO and
CATO were explicitly identified by Horty in [26] and [30] as the
source of the factors used in his formal account of precedential
constraint, which is the starting point for subsequent discussions
of this topic. Moreover both HYPO dimensions and CATO factors
resulted from thorough domain analyses. Most of the many systems
addressing US Trade Secrets have taken both the analysis of the
domain and the ascription of factors to cases from CATO [3].
In HYPO cases are represented as collections of facts (see Appen-
dix B of [6]). There are thirteen implemented dimensions (Appendix
F of [6]) which may be applicable to a case on the basis of these
facts. In general a dimension can take a range of values, but in fact
ten of the thirteen were two-valued. A list of HYPO’s dimensions,
summarising Appendix F of [6], is given in Table 1.
Dimensions identify the aspects of cases which need to be con-
sidered to see if they are applicable:
Each dimension has prerequisites that must be satis-
fied in order for the dimension to be applicable. For
example, the dimension Secrets-Voluntarily-Disclosed
has as one of its prerequisites that the plaintiff made
disclosures of confidential information to outsiders.
([44], p 67)).
Although disclosures to outsiders may be a reason to find for the
defendant, the lack of disclosures was never found to be used as a
reason to find for the plaintiff in the analysed cases [44]: because the
plaintiff is expected to take measures to protect the secret, simply
refraining from disclosure seems not to strengthen the plaintiff’s
case. Thus this dimension is not applicable if no disclosures were
made. Typically only a few dimensions will be applicable in any
given case: in HYPO four or five is typical.
2.1 From Dimensions to Factors
Even if applicable, the value on the dimension may be such that
it does not favour either party; the dimension may be neutral in
the particular case. Applicable dimensions must be assessed for
their legal significance for the particular case, that is whether they
favour a party, and if so, which one. This significance is shown by
ascribing a factor to the case. A factor is present if the case lies
within a range on a dimension which favours a particular side. At
one end the dimension will either be inapplicable because it does
not affect the strength of a side’s case, or it will favour a particular
side. Moving along the dimension we may enter a neutral area
favouring neither side, and then an area which favours the other
side. In practice many dimensions have only two points and either
favour a particular side or are inapplicable. For a many-valued
dimension, such as D3d, if sufficient disclosures to provide a reason
for the defendant were made, then the corresponding factor (F10d)
applies. It may be, however, that too few disclosures were made
to favour the defendant (e.g. Emery v Marcan “Even though parts
drawings may on occasion have been shown to a limited number of
outsiders for a particular purpose, this did not in itself necessarily
destroy the secrecy which protected them.”). Here no factor will
apply (although the dimension remains applicable if any disclosures
were made, because whether the factor should be ascribed needs to
be considered). The point about neutrality is made in [44]
Note that CATO does not automatically treat the fact
that a factor does not apply to a case as a strength for
the opponent. ([44], pp 68-9).
As can be seen from Table 1, only one dimension, D13b, Security
Measures, was seen as capable of favouring both sides.
[...] the Security-Measures dimension was broken into
two factors: Security-Measures [F6p], favoring the
plaintiff, and No-Security-Measures [F19d], favoring
the defendant. This was done because judges explic-
itly said that the fact that plaintiff had taken no secu-
rity measures was a positive strength for the oppo-
nent. By contrast, Ashley and Aleven did not create a
“No-Secrets-Disclosed-Outsiders” factor because they
found no cases where judges had said that the absence
of any disclosures to outsiders was a positive strength
for the plaintiff. ([44], p 69).
Thus the security measures dimension is always applicable, al-
though it is possible that neither F6p nor F19d is present: the plaintiff
may have taken sufficient measures to prevent the lack of concern
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Table 1: Dimensions in HYPO and their corresponding CATO factors. Dimension and Factor IDs are D or F for dimension or
factor (factor numbers are those in CATO) followed by p, d, or b to indicate whether it can favour plaintiff, defendant or both.







D1p Competitive Advantage Gained Computed fromdevelopment time and cost Many F8p
D2d Vertical Knowledge Vertical or technical 2 F11d
D3d Secrets Voluntarily Disclosed Number of Disclosures Many F10d F27d
D4d Disclosures Subject to Restriction Yes or No 2 F12p
D5p Agreement Supported by Consideration Something or Nothing 2
D6p Common Employee Paid to Change Employers Something or Nothing 2 F2d
D7p Exists Express Noncompetition Agreement Yes or No 2 F13p
D8p Common Employee Transferred Product Tools Something or Nothing 2 F7p
D9p Non-Disclosure Agreement Re Defendant Access Yes or No 2 F4p
D10d Common Employee Sole Developer Yes or No 2 F3d
D11d Non-disclosure Agreement Specific Yes or No 2 F5d
D12d Disclosure in Negotiations with Defendant Yes or No 2 F1d
D13b Security Measures Range of possible measures 8 F6p F19d
being a strength for the defendant, but without sufficient rigour
to be a reason to find for the plaintiff. Thus, although it is always
relevant to consider the security measures taken, in many cases
there will be no legal significance. Indeed many cases in CATO
[3] do not have either F6p or F19d. Of the thirteen dimensions
in HYPO, ten, the two-valued dimensions, are either inapplicable
or favour a particular side. Of the three multi-valued dimensions,
two are considered, if applicable, to be either neutral or capable of
favouring only one party (defendant for disclosures, and plaintiff
for competitive advantage). Only security measures is capable of
favouring either side, or being neutral.
Note, however, that in one case, disclosures to outsiders, there are
two pro-defendant factors associated with the dimension. As well
as F10d, SecretsDisclosedOutsiders, we also have F27d DisclosureIn-
PublicForum. This is because F27d provides a much stronger reason
for the defendant than F10d, so that it might be that a plaintiff
factor such as F12p OutsiderDisclosuresRestricted would defeat F10d
but not F27d. Thus a dimension may give rise to multiple factors
favouring the same side.
This understanding of dimensions and factors shows why it is
a mistake to speak of the “negations” of base level factors, as in
some recent formally oriented approaches (e.g. [50], [37]). CATO
used two distinct factors for the rare case where a dimension could
favour either side. Moreover, if a factor is absent, a different factor
favouring that side may be present, as with disclosures. Thus the
absence of F10d might mean that no disclosures had been made, so
that the dimension was inapplicable; that too few disclosures had
been made, meaning that the dimension was not legally significant
in this case; or that disclosures had been made in a public forum,
so that the stronger F27d was present. There seems little sense in
wrapping these three quite different notions under the “negation”
of F10d. Nor is negation needed to distinguish cases where a base
level factor is known absent from those where there is no infor-
mation about that factor. If a base level factor is not mentioned in
the opinion, it played no role in the decision, and hence can safely
be considered absent. The absence of a base level factor does not
provide a reason for the other side, and so its absence will be men-
tioned only when its presence was considered but rejected because
the case fell into a neutral area on an applicable dimension.
In addition to the fourteen factors derived from the HYPO di-
mensions in Table 1, CATO introduced another twelve factors. This
is because CATO analysed considerably more cases than HYPO
and seems to have included more cases questioning whether the
information was a trade secret rather than whether there was a
confidential relationship. In Table 2 we have related these additional
factors to dimensions in the manner of Table 1. These additional
factors can be accommodated in seven dimensions, only one of
which, D14b, has both plaintiff and defendant factors. Three have
multiple factors for the same side. Four are two-valued. The mix is
similar to that found in HYPO, and so may be considered typical.
That the additional cases analysed by CATO led to additional
factors and dimensions is an indication of how precedent cases are
the source of dimensions and factors. The opinions in precedents
show what aspects of the cases judges thought relevant, and what,
if any, significance they accorded to them in that case. Any given
case will only have a few applicable dimensions, and so will only
contain a small subset of possible factors. Therefore as we analyse
more cases we are likely to encounter more dimensions and more
distinctions and hence more factors.
2.2 Arguing with Factors
HYPO and CATO were not concerned with determining or pre-
dicting outcomes, but rather the identification of arguments for
the two parties. These arguments were organised in the “three ply”
structure common in law (e.g. US Supreme Court Oral Argument
and witness testimony which follows the initial questions with a
cross examination and a redirect). In this structure an outcome is
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Table 2: Factors Introduced in CATO Organised into Dimensions. See Table 3 for factor names.







D14b Use Of Available Information Various types of use Many F14p F16d F25d F17d
D15p Similarity Of Products Degrees of similarity Many F15p F18p
D16d Availability Of Information Various forms of availability Many F20d F24d
D17p Invasive Techniques Yes or No 2 F22p
D18p Obtained by Deception Yes or No 2 F26p
D19d Confidentiality Waived Yes or No 2 F23d
D20p Knew Confidential Yes or No 2 F21p
proposed, a response made by the other side followed by a rebut-
tal from the original side. For reasoning with precedents with the
proponent arguing for the plaintiff, these three plies in CATO are:
(1) Cite the precedent case with a decision for the desired side
which has the most factors in common and fewest distin-
guishing factors compared with the current case. The side
favoured by the factors does not matter.
(2) The opponent may distinguish the cited case. Typically the
new case will not contain exactly the same factors as the
precedent. Some of these differences will make the case
stronger for the plaintiff: plaintiff factors in the current case
but not the precedent, and defendant factors in the precedent
but not the current case. The defence will be wise to remain
silent as to these differences. If, however, the precedent con-
tains plaintiff factors not in the current case, or defendant
factors in the current case but not the precedent, the differ-
ences may be significant and so provide an argument not to
follow the cited precedent2.
(3) The proponent may now attempt a rebuttal: downplaying
distinctions by citing factors favouring the plaintiff (the dif-
ferences the defendant could not use in the second ply).
Assuming that the opponent was able to make some distinctions
in the second ply, it is now up to the user to decide whether, given
the rebuttal, the distinctions are of sufficient weight to merit an
outcome different from the precedent case.
This method of arguing with precedents is the basis of the formal
characterisations of precedential cases discussed in the next section.
Precedents are converted into sets of rules with conjunctions of
factors as antecedents. These rules constrain a new case if there is a
rule applicable to the new case which finds for a particular side (ply
1) which cannot be distinguished (ply 2), and which is preferred to
any applicable rule favouring the other side (ply 3).
3 MODELS OF PRECEDENTIAL CONSTRAINT
HYPO and CATO were realised as programs, with the knowledge
represented as particular data structures (e.g. case frames in HYPO),
and the operation of the reasoning defined in terms of algorithms
manipulating these structures (the algorithms for CATO are given
in Appendix 3 of [3]). As such, reasoning with cases was not readily
amenable to logical analysis until Prakken and Sartor provided a
2In HYPO and CATO the opponent can also cite counter examples in this ply, but we
will not discuss counter examples in this paper.
means of expressing precedent cases as a sets of rules [39]. Since
the factors for the plaintiff provide a reason to find for the plaintiff
and the factors favouring the defendant a reason to find for the
defendant, the decision in the case can be seen as expressing a pref-
erence for one of these reasons. The conjunction of all the factors
for a side is the strongest reason for that side, so the precedent can
be modelled as a set of three rules expressing that the strongest
reason for the winner was preferred to the strongest reason for the
loser. Where the case comprises a set of factors 𝑃 ∪ 𝐷 where 𝑃 is
the set of plaintiff factors and 𝐷 the set of defendant factors, the
three rules are:
r1: 𝑃 → plaintiff; r2: 𝐷 → defendant;
r3: 𝑟2 ≺ 𝑟1 if the decision was for the plaintiff and 𝑟1 ≺ 𝑟2 if
the decision was for the defendant.
If we represent all the precedents in the domain using this tech-
nique we can build a logcal theory representing our case base of
precedents. If we are given a new case, we can see whether the rules
apply to it, and if so whether an outcome is determined by the cur-
rent theory. A distinction will mean that the winner’s rule does not
apply or that the loser may have a stronger rule. This representation
was used in [9] in which the possible sets of plaintiff factors were
represented as a partial order, the possible sets of defendant factors
were represented as a partial order, and the precedents as ordering
relations between these two partial orders. The nodes contain all
the possible antecedents for plaintiff and defendant rules and the
arcs show the priorities between particular rules. The example from
[9] is shown in Figure 1. Deciding a new case is now a matter of
adding an arc between the two relevant nodes representing the
factors in the new case and deciding which way the arrow should
point. The constraint is that the arrow should not introduce a cycle
since this would introduce an inconsistency to the case base. Thus
a case which could introduce a cycle is constrained, but if no cycle
can result, the judge is free to decide either way.
This idea was refined and presented in a more rigorous way by
Horty in [26] and further refined in [30]. Horty was interested in
modelling two different accounts of precedential constraint from
the jurisprudence literature. One is a very strict version, for which
Horty cites [5]. Here any distinction between the precedent and the
current case is enough to allow the judge to come to a different deci-
sion. This version, which corresponds to Figure 1, is now normally
termed the results model in AI and Law [37]. This model encodes
precedents as rules in the same way as [39] and [9]. Any weakening
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Figure 1: Plaintiff and Defendant lattices with two prece-
dents from [9]. Precedent 1 was [A,B,C,D,E] found for
plaintiff and Precedent 2 was [A,D,E] found for defendant.
of the plaintiff’s case or strengthening of the defendant’s case is
enough to prevent a precedent for the plaintiff from being followed
(and vice versa). Although this model provides an unchallengeable
constraint when the rule is applicable, the standard required for
the rule to be applicable is rather high. Even with only 3 factors for
each side we have 64 possible comparisons, and if we have the 13
factors for each side from CATO we have 226 (67,108,864) compar-
isons of sets of plaintiff factors with sets of defendant factors [1].
Of course, an example of every comparison is not needed, but still,
given the number of possible distinctions, expecting enough prece-
dents to provide significant guidance is unrealistic. This suggests
that the result model does not offer us enough constraints from
the precedents: rarely will the match be exact enough to constrain
the decision. Horty therefore used an alternative model, which he
termed the reason model and attributed to [31]. Horty noted that
although the full set of factors for the plaintiff represented the best
reason to decide for the plaintiff, a subset of these factors may well
have been sufficient to defeat the defendant reason without the
additional factors. Thus instead of representing the winner’s rule
by the full set of factors favouring the winner, the winner could
be represented by a subset of these factors, which can be seen as
the reason for the case. Thus in the first precedent of Figure 1, we
could see the reason for deciding the first case for the plaintiff
as 𝐵 → plaintiff 3, so that future cases containing [𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐷, 𝐸] and
[𝐵,𝐶, 𝐷, 𝐸] will also be constrained for the plaintiff, without being
distinguished by the absence of 𝐶 and 𝐴 respectively as was the
case with the results model shown in Figure 1. Horty formalised
this reason model in [26]. For a formal comparison of the result
and reason models of factor based precedential constraint see [37].
3.1 Criticisms of the Reason Model of
Precedential Constraint with Factors
Horty’s formalisation of the reason model provides an effective way
of characterising precedential constraint using factors. But there
have been several questions raised about it.
Rigoni advanced two criticisms in [41]. First, he pointed to cases
with multiple rationales:
3Of course, identifying the reason in practice is not a straightforward task: it requires
close analysis of the decision and there my be different interpretations of the decision.
The problem is avoided by the more conservative results model, at the expense of
constraining far fewer cases
The first problematic sort of cases are those in which
the court makes a decision on the basis of multiple le-
gal rules, each of which would be sufficient for the de-
cision. These are sometimes known as cases with alter-
native holdings” [34] ... Consider Newport Yacht Basin
Ass’n ... the defendant prevailed and was awarded
attorney’s fees “based upon a prevailing party provi-
sion of a purchase and sale agreement, a contractual
indemnity provision, and principles of equitable in-
demnity” (NYBA 2012, p. 75). According to the trial
court judge, each of these was sufficient to justify the
awarding of attorney’s fees. ([41], p 141).
In such cases it is impossible to choose between the alternative
holdings to give the rule to represent the case in the theory. This,
however, is not an insurmountable problem: we can simply include
all of these rules in our theory, each with a preference over the rule
for the other side in the case.
Rigoni’s second observation is that not all precedents can be seen
as expressing a preference between reasons. Some cases instead
lay out a method for considering cases of a particular type. Rigoni
termed these framework precedents, and used Lemon v. Kurtzman
(1971) as his example:
In that case the US Supreme Court addressed the ques-
tion of whether Pennsylvania’s and Rhode Island’s
statutes that provided money to religious primary
schools subject to state oversight violated the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment. The court
introduced a three-pronged test and ultimately
ruled that both programs did violate the Establish-
ment Clause. ([41], p 142. Emphasis ours).
In Lemon it is not the balance of factors that led to the decision that
are instructive, but the tests themselves. These tests will be applied
in future cases, providing a set of issues that give a framework for
deciding future cases. Framework precedents did not arise in CATO
because the Restatements of Torts4 provides just such a framework
of issues, which formed the basis of the factor hierarchy in CATO,
rendering framework precedents unnecessary.
Another problem arises from the possibility of there being several
factors for the same side with different strengths on a dimension.
Consider the following example:
Example 1. Consider a case in which the plaintiff had a unique
product (F15p), but made disclosures to outsiders (F10d), which was
found for the defendant. This gives the three rules:
r1: F15p→ plaintiff; r2: F10d→ defendant
r3: r1 ≺ r2
Now consider a case where the plaintiff had made the disclosures
in a public forum, so that F27d applies rather than F10d. Now r2
does not match, and so the theory does not constrain the new case.
But since F27d is stronger on the dimension than F10d, the new
case should, a fortiori, be decided for the defendant on the basis of
the precedent.
This problem has a simple pragmatic fix: where a factor is in-
cluded in a case, include also all weaker factors on that dimension.
4The relevant section, section 757, Liability for disclosure or use of another’s Trade
Secret, can be found at https://www.lrdc.pitt.edu/ashley/restatem.htm.
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So the new case becomes [F15p, F10d, F27d] and r2 will match. This
will work from a logical perspective, although care must be taken
to use the factor actually present in any explanation.
The fourth criticism is simply that even the reason model does
not constrain enough cases. This is because no account is taken
of whether the distinction is sufficient to overturn the rule. The
reason model as formalised above accepts any distinction, whereas
in CATO distinctions can be rejected through downplaying through
substitution and cancellation [40] of factors. The point is clear in
the following example.
Example 2. Here we have two cases, both found for the plaintiff.
In case 1 the plaintiff took security measures (F6p) and, although
the defendant claimed the information was reverse engineerable
(F16d), the plaintiff won5. In the second case we have the plaintiff
making disclosures (F10d), but restricting these disclosures (F12p).
Here the preference for the plaintiff is clear. We therefore have the
following rules:
r1: F6p→ plaintiff r4 F12p→ plaintiff
r2: F16d→ defendant r5: F10d→ defendant
r3: r2 ≺ r1 r6: r5 ≺ r4
Now consider a case with all four factors: [F6p, F12p. F10d, F16d].
It seems this should clearly be found for the plaintiff: however, we
cannot apply r1 because of the distinction F10d and we cannot
apply r4 because F16d distinguishes. Although neither distinction
would be significant in CATO, being cancelled for both precedents
by the other factors available, the reason model gives the case as
unconstrained. We will address this problem in the next section.
4 THE IMPORTANCE OF ISSUES
The fourth problem discussed in the previous section arises because
the reason model considers cases as unstructured bundles of factors,
so that a difference which should not be considered significant
prevents us from applying the rule which should constrain the
case. We can use knowledge of the domain structure to solve this
problem. That we do not exploit the full power of our precedents if
we consider whole cases was noticed by Branting in [17]:
combining portions of multiple precedents can permit
new cases to be resolved that would be indeterminate
if new cases could only be compared to entire prece-
dents. ([17], Abstract).
When Brüninghaus and Ashley adapted CATO to predict cases in
IBP [21] they structured the cases around issues, as did Grabmair in
his prediction system VJAP [24]. Grabmair reports an improvement
over IBP through the use of values, but values raise several addi-
tional questions, such as the extent to which they are promoted by
different factors and whether value preferences are global, or local
to issues. Since precedential constraint with values has not yet been
given a formal characterisation, we will restrict our consideration in
this paper to factors. Issues are a well known concept in law: many
law schools teach the Issue-Rule-Application-Conclusion (IRAC)
method (or some variant) as a way of analysing legal cases. The
5This preference for F6p was used in Mason v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 518 So.2d 130
(Ala.Civ.App.1987): “courts have protected information as a trade secret despite ev-
idence that such information could be easily duplicated by others competent in the
given field. KFC Corp. v. Marion-Kay Co., 620 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D.Ind. 1985); Sperry
Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549 (D.Conn. 1964)”.
IRAC method was applied to the explanation of factor based rea-
soning in [11]. A key point about IRAC is that the rule (the reason
in the sense of the model above) relates to an issue, not to the case
as a whole. The issues in US Trade Secrets Law, taken from the
Restatement of Torts, were used to group related factors together
for IBP [21] and VJAP [24]. These issues were also the basis for the
factor hierarchy in [3] and the Abstract Dialectical Framework in
[2]. A similar structure is given by Rigoni’s framework precedents,
and we would argue that the role of framework precedents is to
identify the issues in a domain. Other systems, such as CABARET
[48] derive their framework of issues from statutes. Unlike factors,
issues can be seen as in a logical relation to the outcome. To find for
the plaintiff, itmust be shown both that the information was a trade
secret and that it was misappropriated. A trade secret must both be
valuable and the information not generally known. To be misap-
propriated itmust be either that improper means were used, or that
the information was used in breach of a confidential relationship.
We can express this as the following non-defeasible rules:
ROT1: TradeSecret ∧ and Misappropriated↔ plaintiff
ROT2: InfoValuable ∧ SecrecyMaintained↔ TradeSecret
ROT3: ImproperMeans ∨ (InfoUsed ∧ ConfidentialRelationship)
↔Misappropriated
In [7] these issues are used to group CATO’s factors as shown
in Table 36. Even though some factors appear under two issues,
the issues contain only five to seven factors, greatly reducing the
possible combinations of relevant factors. That using issues rather
than whole cases to constrain decisions will enable us to decide
more cases is evidenced by [21]. The issue based IBP was able
to reach a prediction in 99.5% of cases, as opposed to the 73.1%
achieved by a system considering cases as a whole.
This suggests that instead of describing cases simply as a set of
factors, we should distribute these factors across the issues they
relate to. Note also that structuring into issues is an implicit feature
of rule based systems such as [47] and [2]. We can now apply the
methods of precedential constraint developed in [27] and [37] not
at the case level, but at the issue level. To see the difference this
makes, we will consider a set of cases7, taken from [3] and used in
[22], shown in Table 4. We have not re-analysed the decisions: the
factors for each case are taken from Table II of [22].
Notice that, in all these cases, some issues are uncontested. It
seems that we can regard the information as a trade secret, unless
argued otherwise, and that there is a presumption that the informa-
tion was used. On the other hand the plaintiff needs to establish that
improper means were used or that a confidential relationship ex-
isted. To find the issue and rule in the case we look at the contested
issues, and which factors led to the outcome. This is the method
used to identify the rule and resolve the issue when applying the
IRAC methodology in [11].
In the next sections we will illustrate the use of the standard
reason model followed by the use of the proposed issue based
6In [24] Grabmair associated factors to issues a little differently. This does not, however
affect any of the factors in our example below, and so we follow [7] here.
7National Instrument Labs, Inc. v. Hycel, Inc., 478 F.Supp. 1179 (D.Del.1979), M. Bryce
& Associates, Inc. v. Gladstone, 107 Wis.2d 241, 319 N.W.2d 907 (Wis.App.1982), K & G
Oil Tool & Service Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 314 S.W.2d 782 (1958), Televation
Telecommunication Systems, Inc. v. Saindon, 522 N.E.2d 1359 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1988),
Mason v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 518 So.2d 130 (Ala.Civ.App.1987) and The Boeing
Company v. Sierracin Corporation, 108 Wash.2d 38, 738 P.2d 665 (1987).
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Table 3: CATO factors grouped by Issues [7]
Issue Plaintiff Factors Defendant Factors
InfoValuable F8p Competitive AdvantageF15p Unique Product
F16d Info Reverse Engineerable
F20d Info Known to Competitors
F24d Info Obtainable Elsewhere
F27d Disclosure In Public Forum
SecrecyMaintained
F4p Agreed Not To Disclose
F6p Security Measures
F12p Outsider Disclosures Restricted
F10d Secrets Disclosed Outsiders




F14p Restricted Materials Used
F22p Invasive Techniques
F26p Deception
F17d Info Independently Generated




F14p Restricted Materials Used
F18p Identical Products
F17d Info Independently Generated
F25d Info Reverse Engineered
ConfidentialRelationship
F4p Agreed Not To Disclose
F13p Noncompetition Agreement
F21p Knew Info Confidential
F1d Disclosure In Negotiations
F23d Waiver of Confidentiality
Table 4: Cases in the Example with Factors Grouped By Issue
Case InfoValuable SecrecyMaintained ImproperMeans InfoUsed ConfidentialRelationship
National Instruments P F18p F1d F21p
Bryce P F6p F18p F1d F4p F21p
K and G P F15p F16d F6p F14p 25d F14p F18p F25d F21p
Televation P F15p F16d F6p F10d F12p F18p F21p
Mason P F15p F16d F6p F1d F21p
Boeing P F6p F10d F12p F14p F14p F1d F4p F21p
reason model. We will see that when using issues, more cases are
constrained because distinctions relating to issues unrelated to that
governed by a rule no longer distinguish that rule and are relevant
only if they constrain that other issue so as to lead to a different
outcome.
4.1 Using the reason model
Suppose our first case8 is National Instruments. As can be seen
from Table 4, the case turned on whether there was a confiden-
tial relationship, given that the plaintiff had made disclosures in
negotiations (F1d). The defendant, however, did know that the infor-
mation was confidential (F21p), and the court found for the plaintiff.
The reason model then gives the three rules:
NatInstP: F21p→ plaintiff NatInstD: F1d→ defendant
NatInstO: NatInstD ≺ NatInstP
If the next case is Bryce, we can see that it is constrained by
these rules: the additional factors are not distinctions because both
favour the plaintiff, and so do not give the defendant anything
better than NatInstD, which is defeated by NatInstP, which also
applies to Bryce. Bryce thus adds no new rules.
8The sequencing of the cases used here is for the purposes of illustrating our approach,
and is not the actual sequence.
Now suppose we are presented with K and G. Here the plain-
tiff argues that improper means were used, because the defendant
used restricted materials (F14p). The defendant counters this by a
claim to have reverse engineered the information (F25d). Moreover
the defendant argues that the information is not a trade secret be-
cause it was reverse engineerable (F16d)9. This is in turn countered
by the claim that the uniqueness of the product (F15p) suggests
that the information was not readily reverse engineerable. In the
judgement both the issues were decided in favour of the plaintiff,
since the reverse engineering had made use of restricted materials.
Note that there was no need to decide the breach of confidence
issue: improper means suffice to establish misappropriation. Al-
though NatInstP applies, it cannot be used because the defendant
has stronger rules than NatInstD. Thus the reason in K and G must
cover two different issues, InfoValuable and ImproperMeans, and
so we get rules spanning both these issues:
KGP: F15p and F14p→ plaintiff
KGD: F16d and F25d→ defendant
9Both F25d and F16d were introduced in CATO and relate to the same dimension, D14b.
However, F25d, that the information was actually reverse engineered, relates to the
issues of whether the whether the information was used and whether improper means
were used, whereas F16d, the possibility of reverse engineering, relates to whether the
information was valuable and hence a trade secret.
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KGO: KGD ≺ KGP
Note, however, that this means that the reasons extracted from
KGP conflate the two issues in dispute in the case. The next case is
Televation. The plaintiff had made disclosures (F10d), distinguishing
all the previous cases, although these were restricted (F12p). These
restrictions were held sufficient to find that the plaintiff had made
efforts to maintain secrecy. Again it was found that the uniqueness
of the product argued against it being readily reverse engineerable.
The misappropriation consisted of using the information, shown
by F18p, and the confidential relationship, shown by F21p. Because,
however, misappropriation was not contested, these do not form
part of the reason. The reason model rules from Televation also
cover two issues, InfoValuable and SecrecyMaintained:
TelevationP: F15p and F12p→ plaintiff
TelevationD: F16d and F10d→ defendant
TelevationO: TelevationD ≺ TelevationP
We now reach Mason. With respect to the existence of a trade
secret Mason is identical to K and G. However, Mason disclosed
the information in negotiations (F1d), which distinguishes it from
this case, and so KGP is not applicable. Similarly although it can
instantiate NatInstP from National Instruments, that case is distin-
guished by F16d, and so the defendant has a reason stronger than
NatInstD. So the reason forMasonmust cover both trade secret and
confidential relationship, and whenMason is found for the plaintiff,
we get the rules:
MasonP: F15p and F21p→ plaintiff
MasonD: F16d and F1d→ defendant
MasonO: MasonD ≺ MasonP
Finally consider Boeing. We have two contested issues: whether
secrecy was maintained, with the same factors as Televation, and
whether there was a confidential relationship with the same factors
as Bryce. But we cannot use these to find for the plaintiff: we are not
constrained by Televation without F15p, and we are not constrained
by NatInstP as used in Bryce with F10d present.
In Bryce, Mason and Boeing, the decision seems clear given the
preceding cases, but only Bryce is constrained under the reason
model. Now we will consider the difference made by exploiting our
understanding of the domain and structuring the cases into issues.
4.2 Using the Issue Based Reason Model
In this section we look at how the sequence of cases in 4.1 works
out if we associate our reasons with issues, and rely on the frame-
work provided by the Restatement of Torts (rules ROT1-3 above)
to combine these partial findings. National Instruments concerned
only one issue, Confidential Relationship, so our rules will be:
NatInstCRP: F21p→ ConfidentialRelationship
NatInstCRD: F1d→ Not ConfidentialRelationship
NatInstCR: NatInstCRD ≺ NatInstCRP
In Bryce, we have the same issue, and we can use these rules: the
additional factor also supports a confidential relationship. K and
G, however, concerns two different issues, and so gives us distinct
sets of rules for each of these two issues.
KGIVP: F15p→ InformationValuable
KGIVD: F16d→ Not InformationValuable
KGOIV: KGIVP ≺ KGIVD
KGIMP: F15p→ ImproperMeans
KGIMD: F25d→ Not ImproperMeans
KGOIM: KGIMD ≺ KGIMP
Now when we come to Televation, K and G constrains Informa-
tionValuable, but we get rules for the new issue, SecrecyMaintained.
TelevationSMP: F12p→ SecrecyMaintained
TelevationSMD: F10d→ Not SecrecyMaintained
TelevationSM: TelevationSMD ≺ TelevationSMP
By using issues, when we come to Mason, the decision is con-
strained. We can use the rules from K and G to constrain Infor-
mationValuable and those from National Instruments to constrain
ConfidentialRelationship. Under the result model above, F1d dis-
tinguished K and G, and F16d distinguished National Instruments.
Similarly Boeing is constrained: by Televation with respect to Se-
crecyMaintained and by National Instruments (like Bryce the F4p
factor is not needed) with respect to ConfidentialRelationship. F15p
would have distinguished Televation and F10d National Instruments
under the results model. Thus by focussing on issues, we are able
to constrain cases which required new rules under the “whole case”
reason model. We also argue that this better fits with legal prac-
tice: not only does it follow the IRAC methodology taught in law
schools, but it also reflects how precedents are used in decisions.
Consider this extract from Mason, finding that the information
could be regarded as a trade secret10:
We note that absolute secrecy is not required ... “a
substantial element of secrecy is all that is necessary
to provide trade secret protection.” Drill Parts, 439
So.2d at 49. ... we note that courts have protected
information as a trade secret despite evidence that
such information could be easily duplicated by others
competent in the given field. KFC Corp. v. Marion-
Kay Co., 620 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D.Ind. 1985); Sperry Rand
Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549 (D.Conn. 1964).
Three precedents are used to justify the finding in Mason: for none
of the three precedents was there any consideration of aspects of
these cases not germane to the specific issue being resolved. Thus
the focus provided by issues means that we are able to constrain
more cases, since we can ignore differences which do not relate to
the issue on which the case was decided. Issues would be even more
useful in the results model, since they would allow us to ignore
irrelevant pro-plaintiff as well as irrelevant pro-defendant factors.
We now look at how we can handle dimensional features of cases.
5 RELATING TO DIMENSIONS
In Bryce the Restatement of Torts was explicitly cited as the frame-
work for considering the case:
Some factors to be considered in determining whether
given information is one’s trade secret are: (1) the
extent to which the information is known outside of
his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by
employees and others involved in his business; (3) the
10Actually this suggests that the court used F6p rather than F15p to defeat F16d. This
suggests that perhaps F6p should be added to the factors related to InfoValuable and
used as the reason in KGIVP. Alternatively, TradeSecret could be considered as a single
issue subsuming InfoValuable and MaintainSecrecy. This, however, is a matter of legal
analysis, and for the purposes of this paper we adopt the analysis of [7].
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extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy
of the information; (4) the value of the information
to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of
effort or money expended by him in developing the
information; (6) the ease or difficultywithwhich the
information could be properly acquired or duplicated
by others. Emphasis ours.
These points are all reflected in CATO’s factor hierarchy. But as
the emphasised terms indicate, ascribing these factors is not simple,
but requires a judgement as to whether the extent is sufficient for
the factor to apply. This point was addressed by Horty in [27] and
[28]. The issue was further discussed by Rigoni in [42]. Horty has
modified his approach in [29], and a formal comparison of Horty
and Rigoni’s approaches is given in [37].
Horty’s main example in [27] is taken from [39] and concerns
change of fiscal domicile, decided on the basis of several consid-
erations including length of absence and percentage of income
earned abroad. In [39] absence was modelled as two factors, which
we will call shortStay and longStay11, favouring no change and
change respectively. But this raises the question of how we deter-
mine whether a particular length of absence, say 24 months, is a
shortStay, a longStay, or somewhere in between, and so neutral.
Horty responds by introducing the notion of a factor with mag-
nitude, (i.e. a factor deriving from a dimension with more than
two values) based on the dimensional fact of length of stay. The
ascription of factors on the basis of dimensional facts can also be
found in [40]. Ascription of factors is constrained by precedents:
in a previous case a judge may have found for change on the basis
of an absence of 18 months, showing on the result model that any
absence of at least 18 months must be considered a longStay. But
the judge may have spoken of an absence of greater than one year,
so that on the reason model that any absence over 12 months is to
be considered longStay. Rigoni’s suggestion was to see precedents
as fixing “switching points”, which determine which (if any) factor
applies for various values of the dimensional fact. Rigoni also notes
that a dimension may encompass multiple factors for a given side
(as with disclosures (D3d) in CATO).
Note here that the precedents which impose bounds on the
ranges occupied by factors are a different kind of precedent from
those which resolve factor conflicts as discussed above: they express
no preferences. Thus what is required to accommodate dimensional
facts and factors with magnitude is not a different way of represent-
ing precedential constraint, but to recognise that we are looking
at a two stage process, with each stage using different types of
precedents. The need for two stages was observed in [40]:
Once the facts of a case have been established - and
this is rarely straightforward since the move from
evidence to facts is often itself the subject of debate -
legal reasoning can be seen, following Ross [45] and
Lindhal and Odelstad [33], as a two stage process, first
from the established facts to intermediate predicates,
and then from these intermediate predicates to legal
11In [39] long duration and not long duration were used, but for reasons explained in
section 2.1, negating factors is problematic and we follow CATO and [44] and use
two distinct factors when the dimension can favour both sides. This also permits the
possibility of a moderate duration being neutral.
consequences. CATO has been explicitly identified
with the second of these steps (e.g. [20]). ([40], p 22).
This can be seen clearly in [7] where factors – the intermedi-
ate predicates – were ascribed to cases by the machine learning
program SMILE, before being passed to IBP to predict the legal con-
sequences. More recently this two-stage approach has been used
by Branting in [19] and [18]. Thus before we can consider whether
a case is constrained, which can be done in terms of factors using
the issue based reason model described above, we must first as-
sign the factors. For some factors, those derived from many-valued
dimensions, this will involve ascribing the factors on that dimen-
sion respecting ranges identified in precedent cases. This can be
done using either the reason or the result model, or using Rigoni’s
switching points. For a discussion of mapping a dimensional fact
(age) into ranges through precedents see [25].
Thus the conclusion is that attempting to model precedential
constraint in terms of cases represented as sets of dimensions rather
than sets of factors as in [37] conflates two distinct steps in the
process of reasoning with legal cases. Cases are not represented
as sets of dimensions: cases are represented as facts in HYPO and
where they are represented as sets of points on dimensions, as in
[40] and [14], these are dimensional facts, the legal significance
of which is unknown until they are mapped into factors. If we
represent cases as sets of dimensional facts (including dimensions
with two values) as in [40], we can derive the factors applicable
to the case. Or we can get our factors through machine learning
as in [19]. We then organise these factors into issues and apply
precedential constraint in terms of the factors associated with each
issue as described in section 4.2. While some precedents will supply
the plaintiff, defendant and priority rules as described in section 3.1,
others will supply rules to move from dimensional facts to factors.
To give an example from the fiscal domicile domain, such a rule
would be something like: longStay← absence(A) ∧ A ≥ 12.
One issue in the ascription of factors is that in some cases they
do not seem to be independent. Thus in the fiscal domicile case it
is possible that there is a trade off between length of absence and
amount of income earned, so that whether the percentage of income
is considered to be “substantial” is relative to the length of absence.
The question of balancing factors has been discussed in [32] and
[23], and an equation representing the trade off was used in [12].
In that paper a single factor (e.g. SufficientIncomeGivenAbsence) is
ascribed on the basis of the two dimensional facts. How factors are
ascribed on the basis of facts relates to the first stage and the focus
of this paper is on the second stage, namely determining how the
precedents, when described in terms of factors, constrain the deci-
sion. Therefore we will not discuss the important and interesting
questions relating to balancing and trade-offs further in this paper.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion:
• Reasoning with cases is a two stage process: first factors are
ascribed on the basis of (often dimensional) facts, and then
the cases are compared with precedents using factors.
• Precendential constraint should be considered in terms of
factors, even if we wish to represent cases in terms of dimen-
sional facts. Applicable dimensions showwhich aspects must
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be considered, while factors show which side is favoured in
the particular case.
• Comparison (for both the results and the reason models)
should be at the level of issues, to ignore irrelevant distinc-
tions, and to reflect legal practice better.
• Precedents do not always have the same role:
– Framework precedents (e.g. Lemon v. Kurtzman) identify
the issues and set out the logical framework in which they
are considered;
– Preference precedents (the standard use in CATO) say how
conflicting factors within an issue should be resolved;
– Ascription precedents (e.g. National Instruments states its
reasons for withholding F16d at some length), give reasons
to determine if a factor should be ascribed to a case or not.
Here we have used the issues from IBP [7]. But we could have
used coarser grained issues, perhaps merging the conjoined issues
in IBP, or finer grained issues, using the abstract factors of [3] as
issues, or even the nodes of the 2-regular hierarchy of [1]. The finer
the granularity, the more decisions are constrained. Experiments
to investigate the impact of different granularities on predictive ac-
curacy would be interesting. It would also be interesting to explore
the use of values rather than factors as the elements over which
preferences are expressed as in [16] and [24]. The possibility of
using multiple granularities could also be explored, with some ar-
guments being in terms of issues, some in terms of abstract factors,
others in terms of values, and others considering whole cases.
Perhaps the best way to deploy machine learning is for the first
stage, factor ascription, as in [7] and [19]. Moreover, if we wish to
address the second stagewithmachine learning, perhaps it would be
better to predict issues rather than whole cases, and then combine
the results using a logical framework to get the overall decision.
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